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CHAPTER 16 
Managing Tax Complexity: The Institutional Framework for Tax 
Policy-Making and Oversight 
Judith Freedman

 
 
§16.01  INTRODUCTION: THE INEVITABILITY OF COMPLEXITY 
                                                         
The title of this volume is Tax Simplification. There is a widespread view that tax systems are 
too complex and that simplification would be a desirable outcome. The length of legislation 
is often cited in support of this observation, as is the method of drafting. Compliance costs 
are another factor; uncertainty in genuine commercial or personal situations coupled with the 
ease with which taxpayers can exploit ‘loopholes’ is a further characteristic often related to 
complexity.
1
 There may also be a more fundamental objection to complexity: that people 
should understand the financial rules that govern their lives and upon which they are required 
to act and take decisions and also upon which, in a democratic society, they need to make 
decisions about voting for a political party. There is a point at which complexity becomes so 
great and unmanageable that it begins to undermine the rule of law, because it does not 
enable individuals to regulate their affairs properly.
2
 
 
This chapter will not take issue with the view that complexity described in these terms 
is undesirable, but accepts that it is, to some extent, inevitable.  The trade-off for a very 
                                                 

 Some parts of this chapter build on an editorial by the author published in the British Tax Review: Creating 
new UK institutions for tax governance and policy making: progress or confusion?, [2013] 4 Brit. Tax Rev. 
373. 
1
 These factors are discussed in a systematic way in the chapter by David Ulph, Measuring Tax Complexity, this 
volume, §4.02. See also Chris Evans, ‘Taxation in the UK – Commentary’, in Stuart Adam, Tim Besley, 
Richard Blundell, Steve Bond, Robert Chote, Malcolm Gammie, Paul Johnson, Gareth Myles & James Poterba 
(eds) for the Institute for Fiscal Studies, Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review 78 (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) (hereinafter Mirrlees Review (2010)). 
2
 As defined by Joseph Raz and others, the rule of law requires that the law should be clear enough to allow 
individuals to regulate their affairs in advance: see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality, ch. 11 (‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’) (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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simple tax system would be loss of equity and the inability to use the tax system for purposes 
such as redistribution and the provision of incentives, which many believe to be important 
functions. This author has argued elsewhere for more care in the use of tax incentives and 
reliefs and her view has not changed.
3
 However, this chapter will focus rather more on 
administrative techniques and institutions for the management of some inevitable complexity 
on the basis that there is a need to enable taxpayers to manage their affairs in advance and, if 
that can be done then, despite the complications, the basic requirements of the rule of law 
may be satisfied. Thus, the thesis here is that complexity should be reduced wherever 
possible, but where that cannot be achieved consistently with other objectives, there should 
be mechanisms to help taxpayers and revenue authorities to navigate through the remaining 
intricacies. Improved institutions could assist in providing ways of managing uncertainty and 
increasing understanding, as well as leading to improvements in the tax system. In the UK, 
however, lack of clear thought about the operation of our relevant institutions means that they 
do not play the part they should do in improving tax law. Whilst this chapter focuses on the 
UK and its institutions, many of the problems encountered will be seen to be similar to those 
in other jurisdictions.
4
 In some cases, the institutions utilized to deal with the problems 
encountered in providing oversight, policy input and planning in the tax system in the UK 
have emerged and apparently shaped themselves, rather than being designed. It may well be 
time for a ‘root and branch’ review of how we manage these matters.5 
 
This chapter will deal (in §16.02) with the question of simplicity as a driver for 
reform in the UK and the political background to this debate. It will then turn (§16.03) to the 
value of an institutional approach to this problem. Section 16.04 will examine recent 
approaches in the UK. There is a proliferation of institutional approaches and, in particular, 
the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) was created specifically to tackle the issue of 
complexity, but new institutions need to tackle the problems at root and it is not clear that the   
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., Claire Crawford & Judith Freedman, ‘Small Business Taxation’, in Mirrlees Review 1028 (2010).  
4
 For a comparative survey see Christopher John Wales & Christopher Peter Wales, Structures, processes and 
governance in tax policy-making: an initial report, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (December 
2012), available at: 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Reports/structures-and-
processes-in-tax-policy-making.pdf. 
5
 The Labour party in the UK has announced its intention to set up a review of certain aspects of HMRC should 
it be elected in the General Election in 2015. This will be a review focusing on treatment of avoidance and 
evasion and not a root and branch review as is needed. It will also take only three months, which casts doubt 
over its thoroughness. See UK Labour Party, ‘Miliband promises to shine a light into Britain’s tax system’, 
Press Release (14 February 2015), available at: 
 http://press.labour.org.uk/post/110986640489/miliband-promises-to-shine-a-light-into-britains. 
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OTS or any of the other new institutions created over recent years have been able to do that. 
Section 16.05 concludes that there remains a need for institutional reform.  
 
§16.02  SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX SYSTEMS 
 
[A] Simplification Cannot Be the Only, or Even the Main, Driver of Reform 
 
Modern taxation systems in most jurisdictions are complex and this complexity is not 
confined to large business dealings or the very wealthy taxpayer. Even those of modest 
means and with relatively straightforward financial affairs can experience confusion and 
obscure provisions in everyday life: what expenses are deductible from their salaries, how are 
pensions taxed, is VAT/GST payable on a certain type of confectionery or not? 
 
It is elementary that a fundamental cause of tax complexity lies in flawed underlying 
policy. The ideal starting point for removing complexity would be to simplify tax philosophy 
and legislate in accordance with clear, coherent tax principles. However, given the intensely 
political nature of taxation and the complexity of the law that governs property, contract and 
commercial law, corporate law and other relationships that underlie taxation, it is unrealistic 
to expect that any jurisdiction will manage to set up completely coherent tax policies and tax 
legislation. The tensions between the characteristics of a good tax system mean that the 
search for an optimal tax system will always be an imperfect balancing act.
6
 The technical 
requirements of good tax system design and political pressures that increase complexity are 
all too evident in everyday discussion of taxation. The immediate reaction of politicians to a 
problem is often to create a tax relief. It is only subsequently that they realize that they have 
also created an opportunity for tax minimization, which then requires further legislation to 
prevent it from creating too much leakage of revenue. 
 
Against this background, simplification can be one driver of reform efforts, but it will 
always be a mistake to make it a sole or overriding objective.  To show the dangers of 
promoting simplicity above all else, consider what might theoretically appear to be the 
simplest kind of tax - a flat tax levied per head (or ‘poll’ tax). Conceptually this is a 
                                                 
6
 James Mirrlees, Stuart Adam, Tim Besley, Richard Blundell, Steve Bond, Robert Chote, Malcolm Gammie, 
Paul Johnson, Gareth Myles & James Poterba, Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review, 39-45 (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
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straightforward idea that can be easily embodied in legislation, but a problem arises due to 
the lack of any relationship to ability to pay. The reaction to this fundamental problem, the 
lack of fairness that will be perceived by many observers of such a tax, will lead to pressure 
for exemptions and modifications. The resultant attempts to make an unfair tax fairer will 
introduce complexity.
7
 So, an attempt to create a conceptually simple tax will either be 
defeated due to the failure to consider other factors necessary for a good tax, or will become 
complex due to attempts to incorporate those other characteristics. This does not mean that 
simplification should not be considered, but it should only ever be one factor amongst many.  
 
[B] Attempts at Simplification May Create Complexity 
 
Well-meaning attempts to simplify the law can create complexity: a phenomenon that has 
been called alternatively ‘complification’,8 ‘complex simplification’ and ‘attractive 
complexity’.9 Steven Dean shows how relying on taxpayer preferences to guide 
simplification efforts may produce forms of deregulation that are not simplifications at all. 
For example, the US check-the-box entity regime resulted from taxpayer pressure and has 
been a popular means of reducing tax burdens, but, in addition to simplification for some, it 
has produced opportunities for arbitrage for others, and created tax avoidance opportunities at 
a domestic as well as an international level. Other types of small business relief can also be 
seen to have introduced a host of new rules, thresholds and requirements, the simplification 
benefits of which can be questioned.
10
 
 
The fact that simplification attempts can result in increased complexity underlines the 
need to consider the essence of simplification. For example, tax legislation rewrite processes 
have frequently been criticized for increasing the length of legislation, despite (perhaps) 
using better and clearer drafting techniques. More fundamentally, it has been strongly and 
                                                 
7
 Thus the UK’s poll tax, the ‘community charge’ of 1989-93, was not only a failure in political terms but also 
very complex. See David Butler, Andrew Adonis & Tony Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics 
of the Poll Tax, 102 (Oxford University Press, 1994): ‘[d]rafting the Bill in Scotland turned out to be 
“something of a nightmare”. The more they got into complexities the more concerned became the Scottish 
Office at the problems of implementation’.  
8
 A word that has been used by various tax authors; see, e.g., Mike Thexton, ‘Complification’, Taxation 14 (19 
June 2013), available at: http://www.taxation.co.uk/taxation/Articles/2013/06/19/309331/complification 
(accessed on 1 October 2013). 
9
 Judith Freedman, Why Taxing the Micro-business is Not Simple - A Cautionary Tale from the ‘Old World’, 
2(1) J. Australasian Tax Teachers Ass’n 58 (2006); Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, 
the Check-the-Box Election and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34(2) Hofstra L. Rev. 405 (2005).  
10
 Freedman, Why Taxing the Micro-business is Not Simple - A Cautionary Tale from the ‘Old World’, above n. 
9. 
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convincingly argued that unless the underlying law can be improved, a tax law rewrite is of 
limited value.
11
 Others, however, maintain that improvements in drafting can be of value, 
even without conceptual simplification. It is this debate about the indicators of simplification 
that has led the UK OTS to produce an index of complexity against which to benchmark the 
existing legislation and to help prioritize its activities. It might also be used as a measure of 
the success of the OTS itself.  John Whiting, Jeremy Sherwood and Gareth Jones give further 
details of this index in their chapter in this volume.
12
 The range of complexity indicators 
discussed there shows that simplicity is not a simple idea and that a single driver of 
‘simplicity’ does not tell us very much about the appropriate tax reform.  
 
[C] Managing the Tax System 
 
If we accept the inevitability of a certain degree of complexity in the tax system, our thoughts 
must turn to the way in which it is best to decide on the balance between the different 
characteristics that might be sought, such as efficient revenue-raising, redistribution, 
provision of incentives and fiscal management. It will be important to consider each tax in the 
context of the system as a whole and to look not only at its design and objectives but also at 
its implementation, impact and efficiency and the way in which it operates in relation to other 
systems, such as the social security system, pension provisions, financial regulation, the 
labour market and so on. The management of these taxes and their practical impact will also 
need to be scrutinized. These are heavy demands that require joined-up and well thought 
through institutional solutions. In the UK we do have a number of institutions designed to 
assist with these tasks, but they have sometimes been created as knee-jerk reactions to 
particular problems or have emerged rather than being designed.  There have been many calls 
for improvement but we have experienced ‘institution creep’ rather than complete overhaul.13 
                                                 
11
 Adrian Sawyer, Moving on from the Tax Legislation Rewrite Projects: A Comparison of the New Zealand Tax 
Working Group/Generic Tax Policy Process and the United Kingdom Office of Tax Simplification, [2013] 3 
Brit. Tax Rev. 321. 
12
 See John Whiting, Jeremy Sherwood & Gareth Jones, The Office of Tax Simplification and its Complexity 
Index, this volume; see also David Ulph, Measuring Tax Complexity, this volume, §4.05.  
13
 For some significant calls for institutional reform around UK tax policy-making, see Lord Howe of Aberavon, 
Simplicity and Stability: The Politics of Tax Policy, [2001] 2 Brit. Tax Rev. 113;Tax Law Review Committee 
(Sir Alan Budd, chair), Making Tax Law: Report of a Working Party on the Institutional Processes for the 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Tax Proposals and for the Enactment of Tax Legislation, Institute for Fiscal Studies 
TLRC Discussion Paper No. 3 (March 2003), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/budd03.pdf;  Tracey 
Bowler, Tax Policymaking in the UK, Institute for Fiscal Studies TLRC Discussion Paper No. 8 (June 2010), 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/dp8.pdf. 
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§16.03  INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES  
 
[A] Variety of Institutions Needed 
 
Complex tax systems need a variety of institutions to ensure good management. This cannot 
negate complexity but it may help to reduce it or alternatively to provide a framework in 
which the impact of the complexity on administrations and taxpayers is reduced. These 
institutions need to provide scrutiny and oversight on the one hand and input into tax policy 
on the other; functions that are different and require diverse skills and approaches. In 
addition, there need to be institutions or procedures that facilitate communication with 
taxpayers about the tax system. This can be done by consultation, which may work well in 
the case of interaction with the professions and with large business and the trade unions, but 
when it comes to the ordinary taxpayer it is much more difficult to create the environment for 
these conversations. What is more, consultation will not necessarily lead to simplicity: the 
more views that are taken into account, the more a policy will need to be qualified, which 
may lead to more complex legislation.  
 
It is important that these institutions have clear functions that do not overlap and that 
they do not become rivals, which will itself increase complexity. They also need to be given 
time to do the work allotted. There is a need for organizations that can react rapidly but also 
for those that can be deliberative, take evidence and consider issues in a joined-up manner.  
 
[B] Tax Policy-Making 
 
In a parliamentary democracy such as the UK, in theory the controls over tax policy and the 
making and drafting of tax law will come from the legislature, but the more complex the 
system the less likely policy input is to be possible at this stage and scrutiny may not be fully  
effective. Add into this the political dynamic, and it will be seen that enabling 
parliamentarians to review tax legislation in a thorough manner is problematic. In their 
review of tax policy-making around the world, Wales and Wales found that there is room for 
improvement in the way in which scrutiny of taxation issues is handled in most if not all 
7 
 
parliaments.
14
 They suggest more qualified support for parliamentary committees involved 
with taxation issues to help overcome the asymmetry of expertise and information that 
currently and overwhelmingly favours the executive against the legislature. This is not a new 
observation, but remains an important one.
15
 They go on, however, to recognize that ‘debate 
in parliament is often highly partisan and the value of scrutiny is significantly diminished by 
the constraints of political allegiance’.16 It must be doubtful whether this last observed fact 
would be entirely counteracted by expert support. In any event, expertise is contested. The 
idea that there is a pure truth available from experts can be overplayed. Even analysis of data 
is based on assumptions and, in the end, decisions may need to be based on political 
judgments. As Peter Riddell has noted, in a comment on the Mirrlees Review: 
 
There is certainly a case for greater transparency, auditing and accountability but tax 
decisions cannot be taken out of politics. They are the stuff of the party battle.
17
 
 
But data analysis is important nonetheless and can at least prevent the worst mistakes and 
encourage deliberation. In the UK at least, politicians seem to spend little time thinking about 
the implications of tax decisions beyond the immediate headlines. As King and Crew have 
pointed out: 
‘Deliberation’ is not a word one hears very often in connection with British politics – for the 
good reason that very little deliberation actually takes place. British politicians meet, discuss, 
debate, manoeuvre, read submissions, read the newspapers, make speeches, answer questions, 
visit their constituencies, chair meetings and frequently give interviews, but they seldom 
deliberate.
18
                        
 
All too often, decisions are rushed and made under political pressure to react to criticism or 
produce a novel idea. Much of the ‘debate’ takes place in the media at a fairly superficial 
level. Social media has exacerbated this tendency. This leads to tinkering, badly thought 
through and ultimately often counter-productive changes, the need for frequent amendment 
and, of course, complexity. Politicians must make the final decisions, but they need to be 
better informed and they should think more deeply about the implications of their decisions. 
Far too often promises are made based on little or no evidence of their likely impact. In the 
UK this is exacerbated by the annual Budget, which has become a media event and is seen to 
                                                 
14
 Wales & Wales, above n. 4.   
15
 See Lord Howe, above n. 13; Tax Law Review Committee (Sir Alan Budd, chair), above n. 13; Bowler, above 
n. 13.   
16
 Wales & Wales, above n. 4, at 8. 
17
 Peter Riddell, ‘The Political Economy of Tax Policy - Commentary’, in Mirrlees Review 1280 (2010).  
18
 Anthony King & Ivor Crewe, The Blunders of our Governments, 386 (Oneworld Publications, 2013). 
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require exciting announcements. This skews the entire tax policy-making timetable. More 
evidence-based policy-making and the availability of expert analysis would be of value, so 
that at the very least potential pitfalls could be pointed out.  
 
For the reasons given above, we should abandon the idea (if anyone ever seriously 
entertained it) that tax policy can be completely turned over to a technical committee. Experts 
are not guaranteed to get everything right - indeed sometimes there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
because no solution is perfect and trade-offs are needed. In the end the decisions must reflect 
the views of the population. The best way we have so far found to do this in a representative 
democracy is through our politicians. What could and should be done, however, is to 
integrate expertise into the policy-making process using better processes than those currently 
employed.  
 
This problem of integrating expertise with political views and the practical advice of 
civil servants is one that needs to be tackled through the creation of the right institutions and 
modes of consultation and proper use of expert civil servants. Bacon and Hope have argued 
that:  
The last thing we need is government by technicians. It is of the first importance to have 
politically neutral professional administrative civil servants of the highest calibre...
19
  
 
The system of government needs to ensure that the ‘expertise of the expert’ in the area of 
taxation is absorbed in a way that can be rationalized and understood - and that its proper 
relationship to policy can be analysed successfully.
20
 Expertise must be harnessed but 
subjected to scrutiny itself. No one source of expertise should be taken to be infallible. 
Consultation must not be permitted to turn into a lobbying exercise or to add unnecessary 
complexities because consultees are asking for special protections or exemptions that are not 
really required, just to be on the safe side. To allow this is to permit consultation to increase 
complexity, rather than to reduce it. To ensure this is achieved, it is important that the civil 
servants and others engaged in the absorption and relaying of this information to the 
politicians are well-versed in these issues and able to ask the right questions from an 
independent stance.  
 
                                                 
19
 Richard Bacon & Christopher Hope, Conundrum: Why Every Government Gets Things Wrong – And What 
We Can Do About It, 304-312 (Biteback Publishing, 2013). 
20
 Bacon & Hope, above n. 19, at 304-312.  
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It is also vital to nurture different sources of information and expertise, both internal 
and independent, which can feed into these processes. Different standpoints need to be 
considered but evidence must be subject to scrutiny, even where those making the points 
purport to have analysed the data. All too often we see a number or a ‘fact’ take hold in the 
press, following which the ‘fact’ becomes widely accepted and it becomes hard to argue 
against it. There is a temptation to over-simplify to make a point: 
 
The public, impatient for solutions to its pressing concerns, rewards those who offer simple 
analyses leading to unequivocal policy recommendations. These incentives make it tempting 
for researchers to maintain assumptions far stronger than they can persuasively defend, in 
order to draw strong conclusions.
21
 
 
Being able to ask the right questions of those experts presenting data is an important skill.
22
 
 
Finally it is important that a way is found for fully informed scrutiny to be undertaken 
by politicians in such a way that it does not become bogged down in party politics and point 
scoring and is not subject to the political pressures of a fixed timetable for action. If there is a 
need for urgent action this should arise from real necessity and not be manufactured by the 
media, non-governmental organizations, business, lobby groups or other politicians. Given 
the nature of politics and politicians, this also requires an institutional approach. 
 
 
[C] Scrutiny of Implementation and Administration  
 
Policy-making institutions need to be separated from, but retain links to, those tasked with 
scrutiny of implementation and administration. The policy may be excellent in theory but the 
implementation could be poor and could create complexities and inequities. In one sense, 
oversight of administration is beyond the scope of this chapter, yet it cannot be ignored, since 
reviews of implementation must be fed back into the policy-making process and lessons need 
to be learned when policy does not work as well as the experts and law-makers thought it 
would.   
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 Charles F. Manski, Identification for Prediction and Decision, 7 (Harvard University Press, 2007). 
22
 Charles F. Manski, Public Policy in an Uncertain World, 174 (Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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Once again there is a need for a mix of oversight by politicians, civil servants and 
external experts. Ultimately politicians must be accountable, but it is important to require 
separation between politicians and the administration of the affairs of an individual to protect 
taxpayer confidentiality and to ensure that ministers will not be accused of meddling with the 
affairs of an individual, either to help or hinder.
23
 This can lead to difficult line-drawing when 
it comes to reviewing administration and learning the lessons of past cases, which are by 
definition concerned with the affairs of individuals. 
 
A further area where oversight is needed is in relation to the discretion of revenue 
authorities. These authorities need to be able to use some discretion to make the tax system 
work, but this discretion must have limits.
24
 Adding in oversight mechanisms can slow down 
administration and appear to create complexity, but it is part of the essential management 
framework for the tax system and a way of making the complexities more acceptable. In 
addition, revenue authorities can help to provide certainty where the complexity of the law 
appears to create confusion. This can be done by giving rulings or other forms of guidance, 
but this discretion to manage complexity also has to be the subject of careful procedures and 
oversight. This can be provided by the courts to some extent, but administrative frameworks 
will also be important in ensuring that the complexities are not only managed fairly but are 
perceived to be so managed. There is considerable concern in many quarters about giving 
revenue authorities too much discretion and so a careful line must be drawn that enables the 
revenue authority to exercise reasonable discretion in a way that is subject to controls and 
operates within the boundaries of a legal framework so that it is a genuine exercise of 
discretion rather than de facto law-making by the administration.  
 
 
§16.04  THE UK INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
 
[A] Tax Policy-Making in the UK 
 
                                                 
23
 Christopher Wales, The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for the Making of Tax Policy in the UK, [2004] 
5 Brit. Tax Rev. 543, 557.   
24
 These issues are discussed further in Chris Evans, Judith Freedman & Richard Krever (eds), The Delicate 
Balance: Tax, Discretion and the Rule of Law (IBFD Publications, 2011). 
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The conduct of tax policy-making in the UK has been the subject of criticism for many years 
and yet no radical reform of the parliamentary process has resulted.
25
 However, there has 
been a gradual change, with new institutions created and old ones developed. In 2010 the new 
Coalition Government published a paper setting out a new approach to tax policy-making, 
with a key focus on simplicity.
26
 This paper introduced the Office of Tax Simplification, a 
completely new body, with the aim of giving weight to simplicity alongside other policy 
objectives. The proposals in this paper also included better consultation and a framework for 
the introduction of new reliefs, given that reliefs are a major cause of complexity. 
 
These promises for improvement came against a background of ever-increasing length 
of legislation, concerns about lack of proper consultation and relatively recent changes to the 
revenue authorities and the way policy is made within them.  
 
[1] The Revenue Authorities: Role, Experience, ‘Absorption’ of Advice and 
Consultation  
 
The employees of the revenue authorities (the civil servants) have a vital role to play in the 
absorption and analysis of the ‘expertise of the experts’.27 In the UK, the civil service has a 
proud history of talking truth unto ministers. The Civil Service Code requires civil servants to 
provide information and advice on the basis of the evidence, and take due account of expert 
and professional advice.
28
 The difficulty is that the same Code requires that once decisions 
have been taken the civil servant must not frustrate the implementation of those decided 
policies. Whilst this must be correct, ultimately, there does need to be an opportunity for 
analysis and discussion before minds are made up, but it seems this does not always happen. 
The less experienced the civil servant, the less likely that person is to be able to deter the 
making and announcement of the decision before due deliberation has taken place.  All too 
often at consultation meetings, civil servants state that ministers are ‘keen’ on an idea, despite 
evident problems, and so the civil servants take the view that it is unlikely that they will be 
able to reshape the policy. The consultation process is thus relegated to the level of detail 
rather than fundamentals. Despite the fact that the consultation process has improved, and 
                                                 
25
 See references cited at n. 13, above. 
26
 HMT & HMRC, Tax policy making: a new approach  (June 2010), available at  
 http://old.tax.org.uk/attach.pl/9358/10987/tax_policy_making%20discussdoc.pdf.  
27
 Bacon & Hope, above n. 19.   
28
 Civil Service Code, paras 10 and 11 (version laid in Parliament on 11 November 2010), available at: 
http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Civil%20Service%20Code.pdf. 
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draft legislation for the Finance Bill is published earlier since 2011,
29
 there are still cases 
where legislation comes as a surprise,
30
 and even where there is consultation, it is not always 
open to consultees to question the fundamentals of the policy. Furthermore, the majority of 
consultees tend to be professional bodies, because they have the committee structures, 
mechanisms and knowledge to respond, and the larger professional firms and businesses. 
Comments from small business, academics and even NGOs, are much less frequent. Attempts 
are made to reach these groups through workshops and meetings, but once again the 
workshops are generally held in London, take several hours and are usually populated by 
representatives of professional firms and representative groups who have the resources to 
staff this. These consultees frequently make important and well-informed comments, but the 
consultation process can be limited in this way. Follow-up publications are sometimes 
circulated only to those who have attended the working groups, and this can act to cut down 
wider consultation also. There can be a perception of lobbying rather than consultation, 
despite the fact that the consultation is open to all. In addition, there are private meetings 
between various groups and the revenue authorities. These have an important part to play but 
there is little doubt that they could amount to lobbying rather than consulting if not managed 
carefully by expert and knowledgeable civil servants.
31
   
 
 So, consultation is only useful if well handled. Some consultations become very 
bogged down in detail. Attempts to adopt simpler forms of drafting are particularly prone to 
being hijacked by objections that a case needs an exemption or should be covered for the 
avoidance of doubt.
32
 Where a relief or exemption is being made available, there can be 
pressure to increase the thresholds for the relief or extend it in some other way.
33
 This takes 
                                                 
29
 See HMT & HMRC, Tax Consultation Framework, published by the Coalition Government in March 2011, 
arising from its Tax policy making paper (HMT & HMRC, above n. 26) stating that the Government will engage 
interested parties on changes to tax policy and legislation at each key stage of developing and implementing the 
policy: see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/89261/tax-
consultation-framework.pdf. This does not mean that there will be consultation about what the policy should be.  
30
 For example, the highly complex diverted profits tax introduced in the 2015 Budget, just months before the 
May 2015 General Election, with very little opportunity for debate and no possibility of questioning the 
underlying policy.  
31
 Court rulings and lobbying help big firms pay less tax, The Guardian (10 February 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/feb/10/firms-lobbying-tax; Vanessa Houlder, UK Treasury unveils 
avoidance reforms, Financial Times (30 June 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f4068508-a298-11e0-83fc-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3VV0rrVNk. This covers the period of the Coalition Government and the Labour 
Government that preceded it, so is not a party-political point.  
32
 See Judith Freedman, Improving (Not Perfecting) Tax Legislation: Rules and Principles Revisited, [2010] 6 
Brit. Tax Rev. 717, discussing the disguised interest legislation, which was initially intended to be principles-
based legislation but became more complex following consultation. 
33
 See the discussion of the OTS below (§16.04[A][2]). 
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us back to the need for the civil servants to be well equipped to act as a bridge between the 
experts, other consultees and the politicians; otherwise consultation can be a cause of 
complexity.  
 
The problems of tax policy-making have been exacerbated by the reorganization of 
the revenue departments following the recommendations of the O’Donnell Report which 
reviewed those departments,
34
 as well as by a program of cuts to the civil service as a result 
of budgetary constraints. An important aspect of this review was the decision that Her 
Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) should have responsibility for all the policy work related to 
taxation, with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), as a non-ministerial 
government department taking responsibility for operational work, including operational 
policy.
35
 This part of the reorganization has been criticized as resulting in a single source 
approach to strategic policy advice, losing an important perspective from those with 
operational knowledge.
36
 There is cooperation between HMRC and HMT on policy 
initiatives, but the lead is generally taken by HMT staff who, although very able, may have 
little experience of tax, will have no operational knowledge because of the need for 
operational detail to be confined to HMRC on confidentiality grounds, and may have moved 
from other parts of HMT or even other government departments. There is a culture of 
frequent movement in the UK civil service which is designed to bring new thinking to bear 
on problems, but which can lead to the importance of operational experience and knowledge 
being overlooked.  This reorganization, combined with deep cuts to staffing for budgetary 
reasons, has seen a loss of many experienced staff and much of the institutional memory of 
those involved in tax policy-making has gone.
37
 This may encourage ‘blue-sky thinking’ but 
that does not necessarily result in simplicity - on the contrary, it can result in legislation 
which contains predictable flaws that then need to be remedied by amendments. Even before 
the O’Donnell restructuring, there were problems with the revenue department staff having, 
                                                 
34
 O’Donnell Review (Gus O’Donnell, chair), Financing Britain’s Future: Review of the Revenue Departments, 
Cm 6163 (March 2004). For further discussion, see Tony Prosser, The Economic Constitution, 41ff and 90ff 
(Oxford University Press, 2014); Bowler, above n. 13.  
35
 This is designed to prevent intervention by ministers in decisions on the affairs of individual taxpayers: 
Prosser, above n. 34, 41ff and 90ff.   
36
 Wales, The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for the Making of Tax Policy in the UK, above n. 23, at 556. 
37
Evidence on the loss of experienced staff was given by the unions and others to the Treasury Select Committee 
and published in their Sixteenth Report, Administration and Effectiveness of HM Revenue and Customs, HC 731 
(July 2011), and see recommendation in section 2, at para. 27. See also James Alt, Ian Preston & Luke Sibieta, 
‘The Political Economy of Tax Policy’, in Mirrlees Review 1204 (2010).  
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as Lord Howe put it, ‘unequalled but necessarily one sided experience’.38 This has not been 
improved by the reorganization.  
 
The situation following the O’Donnell reorganization makes the need for external 
expertise very great. This could be achieved, at least partially, through consultation, subject 
to the concerns discussed above. Secondments from the private sector and academia could 
also bring in expertise, although secondments from the ‘Big Four’ accountancy firms have 
attracted considerable criticism from the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and others on 
the basis that they can create ‘cosiness’.39 To some extent this is unfair, and this expertise 
does need to be harnessed, but perceptions have to be taken seriously and the process handled 
with care. Thus, external expertise and experience need to be brought into tax policy-making, 
but the problems of lobbying and influence need to be dealt with by handling the ‘expertise of 
the expert’ with understanding and insight. This expertise needs to be absorbed and translated 
for use by government ministers, other politicians and the public. Pressures to create 
exemptions, reliefs and special cases need to be resisted unless a good case can be made out. 
Complexity in legislation can be resisted best by those with a clear sense of the objectives of 
that legislation and the fundamental underlying principles. Sensible use of expertise and 
removal of complexity go hand in hand. Only a well-trained, well-resourced and experienced 
civil service will be able to manage that process. They need the ability not only to absorb and 
translate the expert evidence and arguments in order to convey them to their political masters, 
but also to act as a buffer between Ministers on the one hand and the lobbyists on the other.  
 
[2] Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) 
 
The failings in the system of leaving tax policy-making advice to the revenue authorities led 
to various proposals for setting up new bodies to engage in tax reform. Proposals have 
included a Parliamentary Select Committee on Taxation and a Tax Structure Review 
Programme answerable to Parliament.
40
 
 
                                                 
38
 Lord Howe, above n. 13, at 119. 
39
 Gavin Hinks, HMRC and Big Four Secondments, Economia (15 March 2013), 
http://economia.icaew.com/business/march2013/the-big-four-secondments. One problem with secondments is 
the cost to the business or organisation making the secondment. Inevitably it will fall to large firms to do this 
because smaller ones will not be able to afford this expense. 
40
 See Lord Howe, above n. 13; Tax Law Review Committee (Sir Alan Budd, chair), above n. 13.   
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The response of the Coalition Government to these concerns when it came to power 
was to create the OTS.
41
 It is unclear at the time of writing whether the OTS will continue 
following the 2015 General Election, but many hope that it will do so in some form, although 
most consider that it will require greater resources and some reconfiguring to be of ongoing 
and sustainable value. It is rather soon to judge just how valuable the work of the OTS has 
been. It has commenced a debate and made some useful changes and proposals, but it has not 
been able to progress that debate as far as many would have liked.
42
 
 
The first error was undoubtedly to call this organization the Office of Tax 
Simplification; an oversimplification of the problems in itself. Lord Howe has stated that a 
simplification banner would not be enough and he was correct.
43
 In its very first project on 
small business taxation,
44
 the OTS did go further than a pure simplification brief and 
recommended that the Chancellor should consider merger of tax and National Insurance 
contributions.
45
 This has not been achieved, but the recommendation has been repeated in 
subsequent papers,
46
 and a level of administrative merger is being pursued, which might lay 
the ground for bigger changes at some point. To an extent, the OTS has skilfully manoeuvred 
its way around the limitations under which it has had to work and has not refrained from 
referring to the need for fundamental changes, but on the whole these have not been within its 
remit.
47
 
Such success as the OTS had had has been largely due to its personnel, including its 
Director, John Whiting, an experienced and widely supported appointment. But from the start 
                                                 
41
 For more detail of its structure, see John Whiting, Jeremy Sherwood & Gareth Jones, The Office of Tax 
Simplification and its Complexity Index, this volume, §15.01. For critiques, see Sawyer, above n. 12; Judith 
Freedman, Creating new UK institutions for tax governance and policy making: progress or confusion?, [2013] 
4 Brit. Tax Rev. 373.  
42
 For the OTS’s own report of its achievements during the Coalition Government, see the summary issued on 
27 March 2015, OTS list of recommendations, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ots-list-of-
recommendations.  
43
 Lord Howe, above n. 13, at 123.  
44
 OTS Framework Document (2010), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/193545/ots_framework_documen
t_jul10.pdf.  
45
 OTS small business tax review: Final report, HMRC administration, paras 7.35-7.37 (28 February 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/small-business-tax-review. The author was a member of a 
consultative committee advising the OTS on this project.  
46
 OTS Employment Status report, paras 10.47-10.50 (March 2015), available at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/408608/OTS_Employment_Statu
s_report.pdf. 
47
 OTS Framework Document, above n. 44; OTS Blog, ‘Readout from the Office of Tax Simplification 
Workshop’ (18 July 2013), https://taxsimplificationblog.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/workshop-readout1.pdf. 
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there has been a lack of staff and funding, as pointed out by the PAC.
48
 Much reliance is 
placed on secondees from HMRC and HM Treasury as well as from the tax professions. 
Perhaps more important is the fact that, although described as an ‘independent office of the 
Treasury’,49 the OTS is stated on its website to be part of HM Treasury. It has no formal 
constitution but is a creature of the Coalition agreement: nothing is to be found in statute. It 
can only investigate matters with agreement from the Chancellor. In these circumstances, it is 
not surprising to find the OTS looking for ‘quick wins’ in its reports, in order to persuade 
politicians that it should be supported as a continuing body.  The OTS staff has had little 
option but to go along with this, but it has resulted in a good deal of ‘tweaking’ rather than 
fundamental change, although some useful changes have been made. 
 
Two areas can be given as examples.
50
 Having been unable to achieve a major review 
of small business taxation, the OTS proposed some relatively minor changes to the basis on 
which small unincorporated firms maintain their accounts and the way in which they can 
calculate tax deductible expenses.
51
 A survey of small businesses suggested that they found 
some difficulty with expenses and accruals accounting, but the responses were far from 
convincing regarding the need for a reform of the law. The OTS proposed a limited provision 
for very small businesses, to relieve them from the burdens of accruals accounting as strictly 
required, even though many probably did not use accruals in any event. The problem was that 
by the time this reform had been processed by HMRC and HMT, the size limits for the cash 
basis had been increased as a result of various pressures, meaning that a number of anti- 
avoidance provisions and other complexities were seen to be necessary. Instead of seeing the  
cash basis as a simple change to reporting requirements, the HMRC and HM Treasury  
legislation went much further, actually using the scheme to change the basis of taxation, for 
example with limits on interest relief deductions.
52
 The result was ‘complification’: 24 pages 
of new legislation, with unadvised taxpayers, who may have been using a cash basis anyway, 
                                                 
48
 PAC, Tax avoidance: the role of large accountancy firms, HC 870 (26 April 2013), available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/870/870.pdf. 
 See also the response of the OTS of 1 May 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/199769/Letter_from_Rt_Hon_Mi
chael_Jack_to_Margaret_Hodge_MP_Chairman_of_PAC.pdf. 
49
 OTS Framework Document, above n. 44.   
50
 These are not the only projects undertaken by the OTS. See OTS list of recommendations, above n. 42.  
51
 OTS Small business tax review: Final report - Simpler income tax for the smallest businesses (February 
2012), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/199180/02_ots_small_business_t
ax_review_simpler_income_tax_280212.pdf. 
52
 Finance Act 2013, Sch. 4 amending Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, in particular s. 51A. 
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now worse off because of the limitations introduced and with businesses which do have 
professional advice exposed to additional costs incurred as their advisers must advise which 
route is best for them. 
 
The responsibility for this failure of the cash basis to simplify has been placed firmly 
at the door of HM Treasury and HMRC by commentators,
53
 and implementation does seem 
to have gone awry. It is also the case, however, that the original idea was misconceived. 
Reforms proposed for micro-businesses are often hijacked by larger businesses in a form of 
threshold creep, and this was not unpredictable.
54
 But the more fundamental problem is that 
this was a fiddling around the edges that should not have been attempted without being set 
firmly in the context of wider and more basic review. With no clear overarching design, there 
was a strong chance of something going wrong. As one ex-Parliamentary draftsman has put 
it:  
 
You start off designing a rowing boat and you end up trying to fly a Concorde and wonder 
why you have oars sticking out half way.
55
 
 
This reform should not have been rushed to fit in with the political cycle. There was 
no particular need for quick reform other than the need to show something was being done 
for small businesses, because it was hard to do anything more fundamental. There was also a 
lack of accountability: the OTS felt that the implementation by HMT and HMRC was to 
blame, while the Government claimed to be following the advice of the OTS. Even had more 
fundamental change been proposed by the OTS, however, this would not have been 
successful without the political will to see it through. The overall result of this exercise was 
not simplification.  
 
A second important example relates to tax reliefs. Despite a stated determination to 
reduce the number of reliefs, the Coalition Government ended its five-year term with more 
reliefs than when it started.
56
 As the PAC stated:  
                                                 
53
 For example, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW), ‘Cash Basis for Small 
Business: Comments submitted in February 2013 to HMRC’, TAXREP 16/13 (ICAEWREP 20/13), 
http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/tax/tax-faculty/tax-faculty-representations/2013-tax-representations. 
54
 Freedman, Why Taxing the Micro-business is Not Simple - A Cautionary Tale from the ‘Old World’, above n. 
9.   
55
 Unpublished talk at Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Business Law Reform conference, London 1992. 
56
 The OTS final list of recommendations, n. 42 above, states that there were 1042 tax reliefs in November 2010 
and 1140 in August 2014.   
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The [OTS] is grossly understaffed and has focused on abolishing tax rules that are no longer 
necessary, rather than more radical simplification. HM Treasury and HMRC should work 
together to make more radical progress in simplifying the UK’s tax code, and should equip 
the [OTS] with the resources and influence it needs to help them do so.
57
 
 
The management and scrutiny of tax reliefs is a topic which straddles the realm of tax policy-
making and implementation scrutiny. At the moment it is being treated as a topic for scrutiny 
by the PAC,
58
 but each relief needs to be considered in context as part of wider tax policy-
making if any progress is to be made. Any exercise to cut down the number of reliefs from a 
list of all reliefs is bound to focus on those which have become unnecessary and unused. It is 
useful to tidy up the statute book, but this is not fundamental tax reform. 
 
[3] An Office of Tax Policy and New Joint Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Taxation? 
 
Real change requires that the OTS or its equivalent is given greater powers, more 
independence and resources. Hopefully the OTS can evolve into a stronger and more 
independent institution, but this will require some bravery from politicians and more funding. 
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) set up by the Coalition Government in 2010
59
 
shows that independence can be given even in areas of high sensitivity. An ‘Office of Tax 
Policy’ (OTP) would be a possibility.60 It could not replace the political process, but it could 
act as a support for the civil servants whose everyday work takes them away from thinking 
about the structural issues of taxation. It would be a way of using expertise and absorbing it 
into political thinking. Such a body could perform a number of functions: investigating the  
                                                 
57
 PAC, above n. 48, at 5.  
58
 PAC, The effective management of tax reliefs, HC892 (26 March 2015), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpubacc/892/892.pdf.  
59
 For further details on the role of the Office for Budget Responsibility, see HMT, Charter for Budget 
Responsibility (April 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charter-for-budget-responsibility. The 
OBR scrutinizes HM Treasury’s costing of tax measures but does not have any direct responsibility for tax 
design, though ideally comment on costing would feed into the design process. Suggestions that the OBR should 
also cost tax proposals from the Opposition parties in the run up to the General Election were discussed in 2014. 
The Chairman of the OBR, Robert Chote, did not consider this impossible but set out the difficulties in a letter 
to Andrew Tyrie MP, Chair of the Treasury Select Committee, on 15 January 2014. 
http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/TSC_pre_election_costings1.pdf. The Labour party 
subsequently pressed for such costing but this was not agreed for the practical reasons set out in Chote’s letter. It 
might be possible in a future election, but would require parties to put forward tax proposals very much earlier 
than usually done in an election: a positive advantage in the author’s view, but one which might give the parties 
some campaigning difficulties.  
60
 Proposed by the author in Creating new UK institutions for tax governance and policy making: progress or 
confusion?, above n. 41, at 375-376.   
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structure of the tax system, proposing major reforms, taking up proposals from the revenue 
authorities and politicians (both government and opposition)  and costing ideas put forward 
before they became too embedded in the political debate to change or dismiss them should 
that be necessary. It could also oversee drafting to ensure that the ideas were translated 
clearly into legislation. Politicians would be suspicious that such a body would interfere with 
the fact that tax is an essential part of the political debate, but the suggestion is not that the 
OTP would make policy, only that it would advise on policy. The ultimate decisions would 
always remain those of the politicians - the government of the day. 
 
An Office of Taxpayer Responsibility has been proposed by Lord Gus O’Donnell, 
although in his version this would focus on vetting new policies put forward by government 
and perhaps the opposition.
61
 The OTP proposed in this chapter would have wider powers 
than this because it would need to be able to initiate reforms, but the fact that Gus O’Donnell 
has proposed something not too far away from this should prevent it from being considered 
completely unviable.
62
 
Staffing of such a body would need to come in part from secondments from the 
revenue authorities and private sector, since their expertise and experience will be needed, 
but there should also be staff qualified in other areas as necessary, with understanding of 
groups not always reached by consultation, including those with experience in various sectors 
of the taxpaying community such as those in the lower income tax group (where interaction 
with benefits must be considered), employee groups, the self-employed and small businesses. 
Academic expertise should also be engaged. It would be important, of course, to continue to 
have alternative academic and policy groupings that could express views that could be 
discussed by the OTP.
63
 
                                                 
61
 Lord Gus O’Donnell, UCL Inaugural Lecture: Building a Better Government, 6 (April 2013), 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/events/inaugural_lecture_24042013. 
62
 Lord O’Donnell was the author of the O’Donnell Review (see above, n. 34) in his capacity as Cabinet 
Secretary, the most senior UK civil servant. This proposal has also been supported by the Association of 
Revenue and Customs, the trade union for senior tax officials: see 
http://blogs.mazars.com/letstalktax/files/2014/07/Tax-Transparency-The-Tax-Landscape-discussion-paper.pdf. 
Some note could also be taken of the New Zealand Generic Tax Policy Process and Tax Working Group, 
described in Sawyer, n. 11, above. An ‘Office of Tax Responsibility’ has been proposed by activist Richard 
Murphy, but the focus of his institution is rather more on  the Tax Gap than proposing fundamental reform and 
he would not permit secondments from the private sector.  
http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2014/10/21/why-havent-we-got-an-office-for-tax-responsibility/.  
63
 Sir Gus referred in his lecture (n. 61, above, at 6) to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, saying that its conclusions 
on tax are accepted. This is rightly so, since it has an excellent track record, but a purely academic institution 
cannot have the level of responsibility and access to data that is required by an Office of Tax Policy. It would be 
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The OTP would have to report to the Chancellor, since it is not possible for firm 
proposals for law reform to be dealt with in any other way, but both its proposals and any 
reports on the proposals of others could also be presented to a new Joint Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Taxation with membership drawn from both Houses, a suggestion with its 
origins in a possible reform put forward by Lord Howe and developed in the Budd report.
64
 
This would replace the current arrangement whereby the Parliamentary scrutiny that is given 
to tax reform comes only after the publication of proposals from the Economic Affairs 
Finance Bill Sub-Committee of the House of Lords. This Sub-Committee does good work but 
has very limited powers. The House of Commons Finance Bill Committee also reviews the 
Finance Bill but this debate is generally political rather than technical and there is very little 
time for proper discussion within the schedule of this Committee and no technical back-up or 
advice for non-ministerial members.
65
 
 
[B] Scrutiny of Implementation and Administration in the UK 
 
Various institutions exist in the UK for the scrutiny of implementation and tax administration, 
as opposed to tax policy-making. These might seem irrelevant in an article on tax 
simplification, and they will not all be catalogued here. However, the recent activities of the 
PAC cannot go unmentioned, since this committee has extended its reach considerably over 
the Coalition period and has pushed the boundaries of scrutiny to their limits and into areas 
that might be thought of as touching on policy. In addition, new institutions are being created 
which, to some extent, confuse the line between tax policy-making and governance, such as 
the panel established to assist in the application of the General Anti-abuse Rule (GAAR), the 
Assurance Commissioner appointed to monitor HMRC settlements with taxpayers and the 
independent reviewer set up to monitor aspects of the application of the Bank Code.  
 
[1] Parliamentary Committees 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
healthy for the IFS to have an official counterpart in relation to tax design (the OBR already costs Government 
tax proposals, as previously explained in greater detail in n. 59, above).  
64
 Lord Howe, above n.13, at 120; Tax Law Review Committee (Sir Alan Budd, chair), above n. 13, at 1 (para. 
7); Bowler, above n.13, Executive Summary bullet point 2. 
65
 In an extreme version of this, the Finance Bill 2015 was passed in one afternoon in March 2015 with the May 
2015 General Election imminent. 
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The PAC’s terms of reference are to examine ‘the accounts showing the appropriation of the 
sums granted to Parliament to meet the public expenditure’.66 Under this head it must receive 
the accounts of HMRC via the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG),
67
 to ascertain that 
adequate regulations and procedure have been framed to secure an effective check on the 
assessment, collection and proper allocation of revenue, and that they are being duly carried 
out.
68
 The C&AG must examine the correctness of the sums brought to account and to report 
the results to the House of Commons. This is done through reports to the PAC
69
 by the 
National Audit Office (NAO), a Parliamentary agency, of which the C&AG is the head.
70
 
The PAC can also commission the NAO to investigate and report to it on matters relating to 
whether expenditure has been properly incurred and its value for money.
71
 Over the period of 
the Coalition Parliament it has done so on a variety of matters concerned with HMRC, 
including  alleged ‘sweetheart’ deals with large business, tax avoidance and evasion and tax 
reliefs.
72
 These investigations of whether HMRC is administering the tax system properly 
soon take the PAC into questions of whether the tax system is well-designed. It is hard to 
consider whether tax reliefs are being applied and monitored properly, for example, without 
discussing the question of whether those reliefs are desirable, because the examination 
involves consideration of the objectives of the relief. Similarly, discussions of whether cases 
of evasion and avoidance are being pursued with enough vigour bring further comments on 
the policy relating to the offences available, prosecutions and litigation. The PAC’s report, 
marking the end of the 2010-15 Coalition Parliament, recommends that HMRC should find 
new ways to tackle tax avoidance by multinational companies ‘rather than waiting for the 
OECD’s work to bear fruit’, and that the number of tax reliefs should be ‘radically’ 
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 See Government Communication Service, ‘Parliamentary committees’, 
https://gcn.civilservice.gov.uk/guidance/how-to-guides/working-with-parliament/parliamentary-committees/. 
67
 An Officer of the House of Commons: National Audit Act 1983, s. 1(2). 
68
 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921, s. 2. 
69
 See, for example, the PAC’s inquiry of 2013-14 drawing on the National Audit Office report, Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs 2013-14 Accounts: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (25 June 2014), 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/hm-revenue--customs-accounts-2013-14/.  
For further information, see Patrick Dunleavy, Christopher Gilson, Simon Bastow & Jane Tinkler, The National 
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 Prosser, above n. 34, at 53. 
72
 In the NAO report, Settling large tax disputes, HC 188, 6-10, 18-26 (14 June 2012) 
(http://www.nao.org.uk/report/settling-large-tax-disputes/), the head of the NAO concluded, on the basis of a 
report by Sir Andrew Park, a retired High Court judge, that the settlements reached by HMRC in five cases 
investigated were all ‘reasonable’ and successfully ‘resolved multiple, long-outstanding tax issues’. However 
his report also confirmed the NAO’s ‘concerns about the processes by which the settlements were reached’, and 
over poor communication with staff, which were considered to have undermined confidence in the settlements. 
The full list of NAO reports on HMRC can be found at http://www.nao.org.uk/search/hmrc/. 
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reduced.
73
 The PAC has no power to make binding recommendations, but it has influence and 
prestige and the support of the NAO, which gives it further weight.
74
 
 
A further Parliamentary body that may assess the use of discretion by HMRC is the 
Treasury Select Committee.
75
 This Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to 
examine the expenditure, administration and policy of a number of bodies, including HMRC. 
The Committee chooses its own subjects of inquiry, including the administration and 
effectiveness of HMRC.  
 
There is a clear overlap between these two Committees and they have been engaged 
in noticeable territorial skirmishes during the period of the Coalition Government. In 2010 
the House of Commons Standing Orders were amended to provide for election of select 
committee chairs
76
 and this appears to have enhanced the authority of the chairs and made 
each of the posts a sought-after ‘power base’. The Chair of the PAC, Margaret Hodge, has 
become a household name in the UK and beyond by pursuing tax issues and calling in the 
heads of global companies to appear before her Committee.
77
 This, together with skilful use 
of the media and the current media and popular interest in taxation, has given the PAC 
considerable influence and there is little doubt that some of the recent developments in terms 
of tackling tax avoidance and evasion from the UK Government have been spurred on by this 
pressure. In this way, the strengthened parliamentary committee, although designed as a 
scrutiny body, can play a part in tax policy-making.  
 
One difficulty with this is that the PAC covers a very wide range of topics besides 
taxation and has no formal advisers on taxation. It is advised by the NAO, which does 
important work on accounts and value for money audits, but which is not staffed as an expert 
tax advisory body. The NAO recognized this itself when it appointed Sir Andrew Park to 
assist on its work on settlements, since it did not have the expertise to do this.
78
 Another 
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 House of Commons PAC, Improving tax collection, HC 974, 5-6 (26 March 2015).  
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 Prosser, above n. 34, at 132. 
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 Standing Orders of the House of Commons, Orders 122A-122C, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmstords.htm; cited in John Snape, The Political Economy of 
Corporation Tax: Theory, Values and Law Reform, 217 (Hart Publishing, 2011).  
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limitation is that HMRC is (rightly) restricted from sharing information regarding the affairs 
of individual taxpayers with Members of Parliament and this leads to many tensions between 
the parliamentary committees and the HMRC officials, since they sometimes draw the line in 
different places.
79
 
 
The parliamentary committees have an important part to play in scrutiny, but are not 
equipped to provide input into tax policy-making, nor should that be their role. If there was a 
properly advised and constituted Joint Committee of Parliament on Taxation Policy, working 
with an Office of Tax Policy, as suggested above, the PAC might feel it less necessary to 
expand its role to fill this vacuum and the NAO could focus on its role of assessing the 
accounts and value for money issues. Adding yet another institution might not seem to be a 
simplification, but streamlining the functions of the committees and allowing them to 
specialize could only be beneficial and would reduce complexity in the long run by 
promoting fundamental rather than reactive reform.  
 
[2] The GAAR Panel and Other New Institutions  
 
In addition to these parliamentary committees, the period of the Coalition Government has 
seen the creation of the GAAR Advisory Panel,
80
 a new Tax Assurance Commissioner and 
Tax Disputes Resolution Board  to oversee settlements, in response to the PAC’s criticisms of 
HMRC governance in this area,
81
 and an independent reviewer for issues associated with the 
application of the Bank Code.
82
 In each case, these institutions have a very specific role, 
which is not a policy-making function, but there is a sense in which they are exercising 
discretion in such as a way as to overlap with the tax policy-making function. In addition, 
none of these institutions is truly independent of HMRC and yet each one is supposed to be 
adding to public confidence and each one has a function that could have important policy 
implications. All three of these institutions are attempts to solve problems that would not 
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arise were tax laws less complex and if fewer grey areas existed. The complexity of the law 
results, therefore, in proliferation of institutions. It may be that the institutions improve 
management and accountability in these cases, but the institutions themselves can also add to 
the costs and burdens of the system on taxpayers unless well designed.     
 
The Tax Assurance Commissioner and Tax Disputes Resolution Board (TDRB) 
oversee settlements with taxpayers in sensitive cases and those with more than GBP 100 
million in tax under consideration.
83
 Given that the Litigation and Settlements Strategy 
governing whether there can be a settlement with a taxpayer
84
 states that a dispute can only 
be resolved by settlement on a basis that is consistent with the law, it is clear that whether 
there can be a settlement is going to be an issue only where there is uncertainty. In deciding 
whether an agreement is acceptable or not, therefore, the Commissioners and the TDRB are, 
of necessity, involved in determining whether they believe there is uncertainty about the view 
of the law initially taken by HMRC. This new system of governance provides some 
protection to taxpayers and to the public generally that arrangements are not being reached 
without good reason, but there are questions about the fact that the system is operated entirely 
by HMRC Commissioners and employees and not by a genuinely independent body. As this 
involves individual taxpayers, the settlements are not subject to scrutiny by the PAC other 
than in general terms.
85
 In addition, the need for this scrutiny may delay valid settlements and 
complicate the law in that sense.  
 
 The GAAR Panel is another example of an institution that has emerged to provide a 
framework to manage lack of certainty in tax law, but which might itself have become 
problematic. It was proposed by the Aaronson Study Group
86
 on the GAAR as a forum for 
discussion to help mark out the place where the line should be drawn at which the GAAR 
should apply: the line between abuse and non-abusive transactions.
87
 The Panel has now 
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changed in membership form
88
 and is being expected to take on tasks it was not initially 
intended to manage. In addition its composition has changed: in a bid to make the GAAR 
more acceptable to practitioners, the original design of the Panel, which involved having 
HMRC representation on it, was changed so that the body became a panel of external experts. 
This was the result of informal consultation which distorted the original intention. 
   
The Panel has two functions. First, it opines on the non-statutory guidance around the 
GAAR - guidance that is recognized by statute but not given the force of statute and so is not 
binding. In practice this gives the Panel enormous influence over where the relevant lines are 
drawn, although the final say remains with the courts. This was initially intended to be 
undertaken together with HMRC:  removal of the HMRC member appears on the surface to 
affect this function significantly, although HMRC can be expected to have their say 
informally. 
 
The other function of the Panel is to give its opinion on the reasonableness of 
transactions (as defined in the GAAR legislation). This opinion is not binding on a court but 
must be taken into account by the court under the GAAR legislation. The Panel’s role is not 
intended to be judicial, and the members are appointed by HMRC, so are not truly 
independent. Nevertheless, the removal of the HMRC member from this Panel during the 
translation of the proposal into legislation confuses the picture and emphasis on the decision 
of Panel members for the purposes of new provisions in some circumstances places a great 
strain on this new institution.
89
 The resulting institution lies somewhere  between a tax law-
making body, a scrutiny body and, some would argue, despite HMRC denials, , a judicial 
body.   
 
The emergence of the institutions referred to in this section was the result of ad hoc 
reaction to problems rather than arising from full consideration and design. Institutions can 
offer a solution to tax policy and tax governance issues, but only if they are planned and 
conceptually coherent. It is not clear that the recent emergence and development of 
institutions in the UK tax arena have fully satisfied these criteria.                                                       
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§16.05  CONCLUSION  
 
Simplification of the tax system can never be the sole driver of reform. Some complexity will 
always be necessary in a complex world. Institutions have a role to play in helping to manage 
this complexity. Institutions can also improve tax systems and sometimes reduce complexity, 
but this simplification will only be achieved if the institutions are conceptually coherent with 
clear objectives.  
 
It has been argued in this chapter that the formulation of tax policy objectives is a 
matter for politicians. Expertise is important but cannot be treated as uncontested, and policy-
makers need an institutional structure which facilitates interrogation of the experts and 
absorption of their advice, as well as a wide range of other views. Scrutiny bodies and other   
institutions facilitating management are important but need a clear role. Like tax policy itself, 
institutions must be carefully designed. A proliferation of institutions can create their own 
complexity.  
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